

Treasury Management Report Q2 2022/23

Introduction

The Authority adopted the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice (the CIPFA Code) which requires the Authority to approve treasury management semi-annual and annual outturn reports. This quarterly report provides an additional update.

The Authority's treasury management strategy for 2022/23 was approved at a meeting on 23rd February 2022. The Authority has borrowed and invested substantial sums of money and is therefore exposed to financial risks including the loss of invested funds and the revenue effect of changing interest rates. The successful identification, monitoring and control of risk remains central to the Authority's treasury management strategy.

CIPFA published its revised Treasury Management Code of Practice and Prudential Code for Capital Finance in December 2021. The key changes in the two codes are around permitted reasons to borrow, knowledge and skills, and the management of non-treasury investments. The principles within the two Codes took immediate effect although local authorities could defer introducing the revised reporting requirements within the revised Codes until the 2023/24 financial year if they wish which the Authority has elected to do.

Treasury risk management at the Authority is conducted within the framework of the TM Code. This Code now also includes extensive additional requirements for service and commercial investments, far beyond those in the 2017 version.

External Context

Economic background: The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has continued to put pressure on global inflation and the economic outlook for UK and world growth remains weak. The UK political situation towards the end of the period following the 'fiscal event' increased uncertainty further.

The economic backdrop during the April to September period continued to be characterised by high oil, gas and commodity prices, ongoing high inflation and its impact on consumers' cost of living, no imminent end in sight to the Russia-Ukraine hostilities and its associated impact on the supply chain, and China's zero-Covid policy.

Central Bank rhetoric and action remained robust. The Bank of England, Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank all pushed up interest rates over the period and committed to fighting inflation, even when the consequences were in all likelihood recessions in those regions.

UK inflation remained extremely high. Annual headline CPI hit 10.1% in July, the highest rate for 40 years, before falling modestly to 9.9% in August. RPI registered 12.3% in both July and August. The energy regulator, Ofgem, increased the energy price cap by 54% in April, while a further increase in the cap from October, which would have seen households with average energy consumption pay over £3,500 per annum, was dampened by the UK government stepping in to provide around £150 billion of support to limit bills to £2,500 annually until 2024.

The labour market remained tight through the period but there was some evidence of easing demand and falling supply. The unemployment rate 3m/year for April fell to 3.8% and declined further to 3.6% in July. Although now back below pre-pandemic levels, the recent decline was driven by an increase in inactivity rather than demand for labour. Pay growth in July was 5.5% for total pay (including bonuses) and 5.2% for regular pay. Once adjusted for inflation, however, growth in total pay was -2.6% and -2.8% for regular pay.

With disposable income squeezed and higher energy bills still to come, consumer confidence fell to a record low of -44 in August, down -41 in the previous month. Quarterly GDP fell -0.1% in the April-June quarter driven by a decline in services output, but slightly better than the 0.3% fall expected by the Bank of England.

The Bank of England increased the official Bank Rate to 2.25% over the period. From 0.75% in March, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) pushed through rises of 0.25% in each of the following two MPC meetings, before hiking by 0.50% in August and again in September. August's rise was voted by a majority of 8-1, with one MPC member preferring a more modest rise of 0.25%. the September vote was 5-4, with five votes for an 0.5% increase, three for an 0.75% increase and one for an 0.25% increase. The Committee noted that domestic inflationary pressures are expected to remain strong and so given ongoing strong rhetoric around tackling inflation further Bank Rate rises should be expected.

On 23rd September the UK government, following a change of leadership, announced a raft of measures in a 'mini budget', loosening fiscal policy with a view to boosting the UK's trend growth rate to 2.5%. With little detail on how government borrowing would be returned to a sustainable path, financial markets reacted negatively. Gilt yields rose dramatically by between 0.7% - 1% for all maturities with the rise most pronounced for shorter dated gilts. The swift rise in gilt yields left pension funds vulnerable, as it led to margin calls on their interest rate swaps and risked triggering large scale redemptions of assets across their portfolios to meet these demands. It became necessary for the Bank of England to intervene to preserve market stability through the purchase of long-dated gilts, albeit as a temporary measure, which has had the desired effect with 50-year gilt yields falling over 100bps in a single day.

Bank of England policymakers noted that any resulting inflationary impact of increased demand would be met with monetary tightening, raising the prospect of much higher Bank Rate and consequential negative impacts on the housing market.

After hitting 9.1% in June, annual US inflation eased in July and August to 8.5% and 8.3% respectively. The Federal Reserve continued its fight against inflation over the period with a 0.5% hike in May followed by three increases of 0.75% in June, July and September, taking policy rates to a range of 3% - 3.25%.

Eurozone CPI inflation reached 9.1% y/y in August, with energy prices the main contributor but also strong upward pressure from food prices. Inflation has increased steadily since April from 7.4%. In July the European Central Bank increased interest rates for the first time since 2011, pushing its deposit rate from -0.5% to 0% and its main refinancing rate from 0.0% to 0.5%. This was followed in September by further hikes of 0.75% to both policy rates, taking the deposit rate to 0.75% and refinancing rate to 1.25%.

Financial markets: Uncertainty remained in control of financial market sentiment and bond yields remained volatile, continuing their general upward trend as concern over higher inflation and higher interest rates continued to dominate. Towards the end of September, volatility in financial markets was significantly exacerbated by the UK government's fiscal plans, leading to an acceleration in the rate of the rise in gilt yields and decline in the value of sterling.

Due to pressure on pension funds, the Bank of England announced a direct intervention in the gilt market to increase liquidity and reduce yields.

Over the period the 5-year UK benchmark gilt yield rose from 1.41% to 4.40%, the 10-year gilt yield rose from 1.61% to 4.15%, the 20-year yield from 1.82% to 4.13% and the 50-year yield from 1.56% to 3.25%. The Sterling Overnight Rate (SONIA) averaged 1.22% over the period.

Credit review:

In July Fitch revised the outlook on Standard Chartered from negative to stable as it expected profitability to improve thanks to the higher interest rate environment. Fitch also revised the outlook for Bank of Nova Scotia from negative to stable due to its robust business profile.

Also in July, Moody's revised the outlook on Bayerische Landesbank to positive and then in September S&P revised the GLA outlook to stable from negative as it expects the authority to remain resilient despite pressures from a weaker macroeconomic outlook coupled with higher inflation and interest rates.

Having completed its full review of its credit advice on unsecured deposits at UK and non-UK banks, in May Arlingclose extended the maximum duration limit for five UK banks, four Canadian banks and four German banks to six months. The maximum duration for unsecured deposits with other UK and non-UK banks on Arlingclose's recommended list is 100 days. These recommendations were unchanged at the end of the period.

Arlingclose continued to monitor and assess credit default swap levels for signs of credit stress but made no changes to the counterparty list or recommended durations. Nevertheless, increased market volatility is expected to remain a feature, at least in the near term and, as ever, the institutions and durations on the Authority's counterparty list recommended by Arlingclose remains under constant review.

Local Context

On 31st March 2022, the Authority had net investments of £20.498m arising from its revenue and capital income and expenditure. The underlying need to borrow for capital purposes is measured by the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR), while usable reserves and working capital are the underlying resources available for investment. These factors are summarised in the table below.

Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)

	31.03.22 Actual £,000	30.09.22 Actual £'000
Housing Revenue Account		
Debt Outstanding	47,423	47,423
Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)	51,584	51,584
Statutory Debt Cap	66,853	66,853
Borrowing Capacity (Cap less Debt Outstanding)	19,430	19,430
General Fund		
Debt Outstanding	0	0
Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)	4,409	4,409
Statutory Debt Cap	4,409	4,409
Borrowing Capacity (Cap less Debt Outstanding)	4,409	4,409
Total Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)	55,993	55,993

The Authority's current strategy is to maintain borrowing and investments below their underlying levels, sometimes known as internal borrowing, to reduce risk and keep interest costs low.

The treasury management position on 30th September 2022 and the change over the quarter is shown is shown below.

Treasury Management Summary

	30.06.22 Balance £m	Movement £m	30.09.22 Balance £m	Average Rate %
Long-term borrowing:				
Fixed	47,423	0	47,423	3.19%
Variable	0	0	0	0.00%
Short-term borrowing	89	0	89	0.75%
Total borrowing	47,512	0	47,512	
Long-term investments Short-term investments Cash and cash equivalents	4,000 55,500 7,713	0 3,500 (652)	4,000 59,000 7,061	1.30% 0.53%
Total investments	67,213	2,848	70,061	
Net investments	19,701	2,848	22,549	

Borrowing update

CIPFA's 2021 Prudential Code is clear that local authorities must not borrow to invest primarily for financial return and that it is not prudent for local authorities to make any investment or spending decision that will increase the capital financing requirement, and so may lead to new borrowing, unless directly and primarily related to the functions of the Authority.

PWLB loans are no longer available to local authorities planning to buy investment assets primarily for yield; the Authority intends to avoid this activity in order to retain its access to PWLB loans.

Borrowing Activity

As outlined in the treasury strategy, the Authority's chief objective when borrowing has been to strike an appropriately low risk balance between securing low interest costs and achieving cost certainty over the period for which funds are required, with flexibility to renegotiate loans should the Authority's long-term plans change being a secondary objective. The Authority's borrowing strategy continues to address the key issue of affordability without compromising the longer-term stability of the debt portfolio.

Over the April-September period short term PWLB rates rose dramatically, particular in late September after the Chancellor's 'mini-budget', included unfunded tax cuts and additional borrowing to fund consumer energy price subsidies. Exceptional volatility threatened financial stability, requiring Bank of England intervention in the gilt market. Over a twenty-four-hour period some PWLB rates increased to 6%, before the intervention had the desired effect, bringing rates back down by over 1% for certain maturities. A truly wild and unprecedented period in fixed income markets, with a direct impact on PWLB rates.

Interest rates rose by over 2% during the period in both the long and short term. As an indication the 5-year maturity certainty rate rose from 2.30% on 1st April to 5.09% on 30th September; over the same period the 30-year maturity certainty rate rose from 2.63% to 4.68%

In keeping with the Authority's objectives, no new borrowing was undertaken, while existing loans were allowed to mature without replacement. This strategy enabled the Authority to reduce net borrowing costs (despite foregone investment income) and reduce overall treasury risk.

At 30th September 2022 the Authority held £47.4m of loans. These loans were taken out by the Authority in 2011/12 for the purpose of HRA self-financing. The principal element of these loans is repayable in full on maturity, with interest being paid each March and September.

The short-term borrowing of £89k relates to deposits received from two Parish Councils within the District. These loans can be recalled on immediate notice. Interest is calculated at the Bank of England Base Rate, less 1%. Interest will be payable half yearly after the 30th September and the second after 31st March.

The following table shows the maturity dates of the loans and rate of interest payable.

Borrowing Position

	Туре	Value	Rate	Maturity
Loan Profile		£'000	%	
Public Works Loan Board	Fixed	10,000	2.70	2023/24
Public Works Loan Board	Fixed	10,000	3.01	2026/27
Public Works Loan Board	Fixed	10,000	3.30	2031/32
Public Works Loan Board	Fixed	10,000	3.44	2036/72
Public Works Loan Board	Fixed	7,423	3.50	2041/42
Total Long-term borrowing		47,423		
Short-term Parish Council Loans		89	0.75	
Total borrowing		47,512		

The Authority's chief objective when borrowing has been to strike an appropriately low risk balance between securing low interest costs and achieving cost certainty over the period for which funds are required, with flexibility to renegotiate loans should the Authority's long-term plans change being a secondary objective.

Treasury Investment Activity

CIPFA revised TM Code defines treasury management investments as those which arise from the Authority's cash flows or treasury risk management activity that ultimately represents balances which need to be invested until the cash is required for use in the course of business.

The Authority holds significant invested funds, representing income received in advance of expenditure plus balances and reserves held. During the year, the Authority's investment balances ranged between £45.5m and £61m million due to timing differences between income and expenditure. The investment position is shown in the table below.

	31.03.22 Balance £'000	Q2 2022 Movement £'000	30.09.22 Balance £'000	30.09.22 Rate of Return %
Banks (unsecured) Local Authorities Money Market Funds CCLA Property Fund	4,010 52,000 8,000 4,000	3,051 (9,000) 8,000 0	7,061 43,000 16,000 4,000	0.53 0.97 1.76 3.81
Total investments	68,010	2,051	70,061	

Both the CIPFA Code and government guidance require the Authority to invest its funds prudently, and to have regard to the security and liquidity of its treasury investments before seeking the optimum rate of return, or yield. The Authority's objective when investing money is to strike an appropriate balance between risk and return, minimising the risk of incurring losses from defaults and the risk of receiving unsuitably low investment income.

The increases in Bank Rate over the period under review, and with the prospect of more increases to come, short-dated cash rates, which had ranged between 0.7% - 1.5% at the end of March, rose by around 1.5% for overnight/7-day maturities and by nearly 3.5% for 9-12 month maturities.

At the end of September, the rates on DMADF deposits ranged between 1.41% and 2.81% and the return on sterling low volatility net asset value (LVNAV) Money Market Funds ranged between 1.62% - 1.83% p.a.

The Authority currently has £5m invested with Thurrock Borough Council which matures in April 2023. In August 2022 Thurrock Borough Council were highlighted as a financial risk due to their investments in renewable energy. During September the Government intervened and appointed Essex County Council to take control of Thurrock's financial functions. Thurrock has since been given permission by the Government to borrow almost £840m from the Public Works Loan Board to repay finance from other local authorities. The new loans will replace the £687.5m of local authority finance and £148.5m of maturing PWLB loans. The risk to the repayment of the principle owed to the Authority, given the measures in place by the Government are minimal if not at all. Thurrock have been provided with the resources to repay its current borrowing portfolio.

The progression of risk and return metrics are shown in the extracts from Arlingclose's quarterly investment benchmarking below.

	Credit Score	Credit Rating	Bail-in Exposure	Weighted Average Maturity (days)	Rate of Return %
30.09.2022	4.69	A+	31%	96	1.16
Similar LAs	4.34	AA-	57%	42	2.23
All LAs	4.29	AA-	55%	18	2.06


Investment Benchmarking – Treasury investments managed in-house (excludes CCLA)

Credit Score: This is a value weighted average score calculated by weighting the credit score of each investment by its value. A higher number indicates a higher risk.

Credit Rating: This is based on the long-term rating assigned to each institution in the portfolio, by ratings agencies Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's. Ratings rang from AAA to D, and can be modified by +/

Bail in Exposure: The adoption of a bail in regime for failed banks results in a potential increased risk of loss of funds for local authority should this need to be implemented. Therefore, a lower exposure to bail in investments reduces this risk.

Weighted Average Maturity: This is an indicator of the average duration of the internally managed investments. Similar authorities have a similar profile to South Derbyshire; other larger authorities tend to hold a greater proportion of fund in money markets than fixed term deposits with other LAs, due to their cash flow requirements.



This chart illustrates the type of investment funds held by the Council in comparison to other similar Local Authorities, this shows in greater detail, the comparisons in the bail in exposure and rate of return, on the above security benchmark table. The unsecured funds held by other Local Authorities is a much higher percentage of their investment portfolio, which will offer them a higher rate of return, however the bail in exposure risk to funds is 57% of their total portfolio., The Council have invested their funds in much safer secured investments (Government) which may produce a smaller yield (1.16%) but the risk to Council funds is low at 31%.

Externally Managed Pooled Funds

£4m of the Authority's investments is invested in externally managed strategic pooled property funds where short-term security and liquidity are lesser considerations, and the objectives instead are regular revenue income and long-term price stability. These funds are expected to generate an average return of £35k - £40k per quarter, its estimated £140k - £160k income return will be achieved this year, which is used to support services in year.

Because the Authority's externally managed funds have no defined maturity date, but are available for withdrawal after a notice period, their performance and continued suitability in

meeting the Authority's investment objectives are regularly reviewed. Strategic fund investments are made in the knowledge that capital values will move both up and down on months, quarters and even years; but with the confidence that over a three- to five-year period total returns will exceed cash interest rates.

		2022/23	2022/23
		Q1	Q2
Dividend Received	£	35,499	40,603
Annual Equivalent Interest Rate	%	3.19%	3.81%
Bid (Selling) Price	pence/unit	357.58	347.79

CCLA Property Fund Performance

The mid-market value of the fund as at the 30 September 2022 is £4,328,524.78 and the bid market value is £4,261,441.92. The quarters market and bid values have decreased from June 22 by 4.25%. This reinforces the notion that the Fund should only be considered for long-term investments.

The authority's investment in the CCLA fund will remain stable throughout 22/23 with performance continuing to yield positive dividends.

Performance

Average 7-Day Money Market Rate

The main indicator the Council uses to measure its return on short-term investments to average over the year, is the Average 7-Day Money Market Rate. This is a standard measure of performance. Performance for the second quarter is shown below.

	As at 30.06.22	As at 30.09.22
Average 7-Day Money Market Rate (Target)	0.87%	1.72%
Average Interest Rate Achieved on Short Term Deposits	0.75%	1.23%

Our current investment profile includes several local authority loans which were dealt during 21/22 financial year when interest rates were not as favourable. This therefore brings down the overall average interest-rate on short term deposits. The expectation being, as these loans mature higher interest rates will be achieved upon new dealings.

Cost of Debt

This indicator shows how much the costs of borrowing impact upon each household (at Band D Council Tax rate) in the District. The impact on Council Tax is positive as the General Fund has no actual debt. The performance for the second quarter is shown below using the current interest received and the estimated annual interest based on current returns. This is compared to the actual annual interest received last year.

General Fund Impact per Council Tax Payer	Actual 31.03.2022	Actual 30.09.22	Estimated 31.03.2023
	£'000	£'000	£'000
Net Interest Received - General Fund	-£136,959	-£125,159	-£100,000
Band D Properties	35,218	36,702	36,702
Cost per Band D Property	-£3.89	-£3.41	-£2.72

The cost of debt on each council tenant (HRA) is shown below. The performance for the first quarter is the actual costs compared to the estimated costs for the year. The fluctuation in interest paid is the decrease in interest rate of the £10m variable loan and the acquisition of new council houses.

HRA Debt Interest per	31.03.22	30.09.2022
Dwelling	Actual	Estimated
HRA Interest Payable	1,527,260	1,456,005
Dwellings	2,949	2,937
Annual Cost per Dwelling	£517.89	£495.75

Compliance

The Chief Finance Officer reports that during the second quarter treasury management activities have fully complied with the CIPFA Code of Practice and the Authority's approved Treasury Management Strategy.

Compliance with specific investment limits is demonstrated in the table below:

Investment limits

Sector	Maximum Investment Q2 2022	Counterparty Limit	Time Limit	Sector Limit	Complied
The UK Government	£15.5m	£25m	364 days	n/a	\checkmark
Local authorities & other government entities	£35m	£5m	364 days	Unlimited	✓
Banks (unsecured)*	£2.4m	£3m	35 days	Unlimited	~

Building societies (unsecured)*	£2m	£2m	35 days	£5m	~
Money Market Funds*	£16m	£2m	60 days	£16m	~
Strategic Pooled Funds	£4m	£4m	n/a	£4m	\checkmark
Other Investments*	0	£1m	35 days	Unlimited	✓

Arlingclose's Economic Outlook for the remainder of 2022/23 (based on 26th September 2022 interest rate forecast)

	Current	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25	Jun-25	Sep-25
Official Bank Rate													
Upside risk	0.00	0.50	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Arlingclose Central Case	2.25	4.25	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.75	4.25	3.75	3.25
Downside risk	0.00	-1.00	-1.00	-0.75	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.75	-1.25	-1.50	-1.75	-1.75	-1.75

Arlingclose expects Bank Rate to rise further during 2022/23 to reach 5% by the end of the year.

The MPC is particularly concerned about the demand implications of fiscal loosening, the tight labour market, sterling weakness and the willingness of firms to raise prices and wages.

The MPC may therefore raise Bank Rate more quickly and to a higher level to dampen aggregate demand and reduce the risk of sustained higher inflation. Arlingclose now expects Bank Rate to peak at 5.0%, with 200bps of increases this calendar year.

This action by the MPC will slow the economy, necessitating cuts in Bank Rate later in 2024.

Gilt yields will face further upward pressure in the short term due to lower confidence in UK fiscal policy, higher inflation expectations and asset sales by the BoE. Given the recent sharp rises in gilt yields, the risks are now broadly balanced to either side. Over the longer term, gilt yields are forecast to fall slightly over the forecast period.

Background:

Monetary policymakers are behind the curve having only raising rates by 50bps in September. This was before the "Mini-Budget", poorly received by the markets, triggered a rout in gilts with a huge spike in yields and a further fall in sterling. In a shift from recent trends, the focus now is perceived to be on supporting sterling whilst also focusing on subduing high inflation.

There is now an increased possibility of a special Bank of England MPC meeting to raise rates to support the currency. Followed by a more forceful stance over concerns on the looser fiscal outlook. The MPC is therefore likely to raise Bank Rate higher than would otherwise have been necessary given already declining demand. A prolonged economic downturn could ensue.

Uncertainty on the path of interest rates has increased dramatically due to the possible risk from unknowns which could include for instance another Conservative leadership contest, a general election, or further tax changes including implementing windfall taxes.

The government's blank cheque approach to energy price caps, combined with international energy markets priced in dollars, presents a fiscal mismatch that has contributed to significant decline in sterling and sharp rises in gilt yields which will feed through to consumers' loans and mortgages and business funding costs.

UK government policy has mitigated some of the expected rise in energy inflation for households and businesses flattening the peak for CPI, whilst extending the duration of elevated CPI. Continued currency weakness could add inflationary pressure.

The UK economy already appears to be in recession, with business activity and household spending falling. The short- to medium-term outlook for the UK economy is relatively bleak.

Global bond yields have jumped as investors focus on higher and stickier US policy rates. The rise in UK government bond yields has been sharper, due to both an apparent decline in investor confidence and a rise in interest rate expectations, following the UK government's shift to borrow to loosen fiscal policy. Gilt yields will remain higher unless the government's plans are perceived to be fiscally responsible.

The housing market impact of increases in the Base Rate could act as a "circuit breaker" which stops rates rising much beyond 5.0%, but this remains an uncertainty.